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1 Seconder discussion (Ch. Robert)
While I fully agree with the authors’ perspective that
there are more objectivity issues in statistics than the
mere choice of a prior distribution in Bayesian statis-
tics, I first doubt switching terms as proposed therein
will clarify the subjective nature of the game for ev-
eryday users and second feel there are deeper issues
with the foundations of statistics that stand beyond
redemption. While surprised at seeing a paper en-
tirely devoted to (necessarily subjective) philosophi-
cal opinions about statistics I obviously welcome the
opportunity of such a discussion.
Indeed, “statistics cannot do without data” but
the paper does not really broach upon the question
whether or not statistics cannot do without probabil-
ity. Although this may sound like a lieu commun,
let us recall that a statistical analysis almost invari-
ably starts with the premise that the data is ran-
dom. However, the very notion of randomness is quite
elusive, hence this aspect truly fits within the pa-
per topic—without even mentioning the impossibility
of establishing randomness for a given phenomenon,
barring maybe instrumental error—. This query ex-
tends to the notion of a probabilistic generative model
and it relates more directly to the repeatability as-
sumption that should not be taken for granted in
most realistic situations.
The central message of the paper is that statisti-
cal analyses should be open about the many choices
made in selecting an estimate or a decision and about
the forking paths of alternative resolutions. Given
that very few categories of statisticians take pride in
their subjectivity, but rather use this term as deroga-
tory for other categories, I fear the proposal stands
little chance to see this primacy of objectivity claims
resolved, even though I agree (i) we should move
beyond a distinction that does not reflect the com-
plexity and richness of statistical practice and (ii)
we should embrace and promote uncertainty, diver-
sity, and relativity in our statistical analysis. As
the discussions in Sections 2 and 5 make it clear, all
statistical procedures involve subjective or operator-
dependent choices and calibration, either plainly ac-
knowledged or hidden under the carpet. This is why I
would add (at least) two points to the virtues of sub-
jectivity to Section 3.3 that is central to the paper
message:
1. Spelling out uncheckable assumptions about
data collection;
2. Awareness of calibration of tuning parameters.
while I do not see consensus (item 2) as a necessary
virtue.
In fact, when going through the examination of
objectivity claims by the major threads of formalised
statistical analysis, I get the feeling of exploring many
small worlds (in Lindley’s words) rather than the en-
tire spectrum of statistical methodologies. For in-
stance, frequentism seems to be reduced to asymp-
totics, while completely missing the area of non-
parametrics.1 Frequentist inference is mostly equated
with the error-statistical proposal of Mayo (1996), de-
spite the availability of other and more mainstream
1 The later should not be considered to be “more” objective, but it offers the advantage of loosening model specification.
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perspectives. In particular, except for the reference
to Davies (2014), the M -open view seems to be miss-
ing from the picture, despite attempting to provide
reasoning outside the box. From a Bayesian per-
spective, the discussions of subjective, objective, and
falsificationist—missing empirical—Bayes do not re-
ally add to the debate between these three branches,
apart from suggesting we should give up such value-
loaded categories. I came to agree mostly with the
subjectivist approach on the ground of relativity, in
that the outcome is always relative to a well-specified
Universe and that it can solely be measured in terms
of that reference. I further find the characterisa-
tion of the objectivist branch somehow restrictive, by
focussing solely on Jaynes’ (2003) maxent solution
(which itself depends on many subjective choices).
Hence, this section is missing on the corpus of work
about creating priors with guaranteed frequentist or
asymptotic properties. Furthermore, it operates un-
der the impression that an objective Bayes analy-
sis should always achieve the same conclusion, which
misses the point of an automated derivation of a refer-
ence prior construct. That many automations are fea-
sible and worth advocating nicely fits with the above
relativity principle. I also find the defence of the falsi-
ficationist perspective, i.e. of essentially Gelman and
Shalizi (2013) both much less critical and extensive,
in that, again, this is not what one could call a stan-
dard approach to statistics.
In conclusion, the paper is appealing in calling
for an end to the “objectivier than thou” argument,
but harder to perceive as launching a move towards
a change in statistical practice. On the positive side,
it exposes the need to spell out the inputs—from an
operator—leading to a statistical analysis, both for
replicability or reproducibility reasons and for “objec-
tivity” purposes, although solely conscious perceived
choices can be uncovered this way. It also reinforces
the call for model awareness, by which I mean a crit-
ical stance on all modelling inputs, including priors,
that is, a disbelief that any model is true, applying
to statistical procedures Popper’s critical rationalism.
This has major consequences on Bayesian modelling
in that, as advocated in Gelman and Shalizi (2013),
and Evans (2015), sampling and prior models should
be given the opportunity to be updated when inap-
propriate for the data at hand. A potential if unre-
alistic outcome of this paper would be to impose not
only the production of all conscious choices made in
the construction process, but also through the post-
ing of (true or pseudo-) data and of relevant code
for all publications involving a statistical analysis.
On the negative side, the proposal is far too ideal-
istic in that most users (and most makers) of statis-
tics cannot or would not spell out their assumptions
and choices, being unaware of or unapologetic about
these. This can be seen as a central difficulty with
statistics as a service discipline, namely that almost
anyone anywhere can produce an estimate or a p-
value without ever being proven wrong. It is therefore
hard to fathom how the epistemological argument
therein—that objective versus subjective is a mean-
ingless opposition—could profit statistical methodol-
ogy, even assuming the list of Section 2.3 be made
compulsory. The eight sins listed in the final section
would require statistics expert reviewers for all publi-
cations, while it is almost never the case that journals
outside our field call for statistics experts within ref-
erees. Apart from banning all statistics arguments
from journals, I am afraid there is no hope for a ma-
jor improvement in that corner.
It is thus my great pleasure to second the vote
of thanks for this multi-faceted paper that helps
strengthening the foundations of our field.
2 About Bayesian transparency (G.
Celeux)
I congratulate Andrew and Christian for their much
interesting and stimulating article. I agree with their
proposition to bring to the fore the attribute trans-
parency instead of the attribute objectivity.
As a matter of fact, statistical models are not ex-
pected to explain or describe the world, but they can
rather be expected to provide tools to act on it. For
this very reason, transparency is desirable.
But, I am not sure that transparency is easy to
be ensured in the Bayesian framework with complex
models. Actually, the influence of hyperparameters
could be quite difficult to be analysed in an infor-
mative setting and this task could appear to be even
more difficult in a non-informative setting. In other
words, in some circumstances, choosing prior distri-
butions could appear to be a sorcerer’s apprentice
game hardly compatible with transparency. Any-
how, transparency of a Bayesian statistical analysis
requires in-depth (and expensive) sensitivity analy-
ses as soon as the statistical models are somewhat
complex.
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3 Subjective Bayesian updating (J.
Jewson)
I thoroughly enjoyed how this paper brings to light
the subjectivity disguised as objectivity in statistical
practise, and I relish the prospect that understanding
the impossibility of objectivity will allow researchers
greater freedom to experiment with their analysis.
Focusing on the Bayesian standpoint, I feel there
is one major omission from the authors discussion,
the methods for parameter updating. It is recognised
throughout the paper that the model used in any sta-
tistical analysis is almost unavoidably taken to be
an approximation of the decision maker’s true beliefs
(or of the true data generating process depending on
your perspective) (Bernardo and Smith, 2001). This
results in statistics taking place in the M -complete
or M -open world The authors regard Bayesian up-
dating to be objective and transparent, suggesting
that if a researcher is able to interpret their prior,
then they will by implication, be able to interpret
their posterior inference. In the M -closed world, I
can believe this is the case. However, in the M -
open world Bayesian updating is less transparent.
It is a known result that Bayesian updating learns
about the parameters of the approximate model that
minimise the Kullback-Leibler divergence to the data
generating process. Nonetheless, in practical terms
I do not believe many statisticians understand what
it means for two distributions to be close in terms of
KL-divergence. The general Bayesian update (Bis-
siri et al., 2016) reinterprets Bayes’ rule as produc-
ing the Bayesian posterior attempting to minimise
the logarithmic score (and as a consequence the KL-
divergence to the data generating process):
π(θ|x) ∝ exp(−
n∑
i=1
−ℓ(θ, xi))π(θ) = exp(−
n∑
i=1
− log(f(xi; θ))π(θ) = π(θ)
n∏
i=1
f(xi; θ). (1)
This provides greater transparency to the
Bayesian updating process, demonstrating that in
combination with the prior, greater posterior mass
is given to parameter values whose predictions via
the model f(·; θ), achieve a low logarithmic-score on
the observed data x. Bernardo and Smith (2001) ob-
serve that scoring predictions based on the logarith-
mic scoring rule places great importance on correctly
specifying the tails of the data generating process, as
a large loss is incurred when an observation predicted
with low probability is seen. Bernardo and Smith
(2001) argue that tail specification is important for
pure inference, but in applied problems the statis-
tician may require their predictions to be accurate
in some other region of the predictive distribution.
The authors acknowledge that information concern-
ing “how the results of an analysis are to be used
or interpreted” should form an important, subjective
part of the analysis. If the tails of the predictive
distribution are important for the analysis, then the
logarithmic-score should be chosen, and this decision
should be documented. However, if the tail spec-
ification is not important, then blindly (implicitly)
using the logarithmic-score under an approximate
model, can produce predictive distributions that per-
form very poorly on the rest of the distribution. In
this scenario the general Bayesian update provides
the tools to produce a predictive distribution target-
ing an alternative loss function.
It is tempting to try and implement the general
Bayesian update without using a model. I agree with
the sentiments of the authors that using a model
is important, it provides another tool to incorpo-
rate prior information into the analysis, and provides
transparency in the way predictions are produced.
Divergence functions and their associated scores, can
therefore be used to produce model based loss func-
tions allowing Bayesian updating to target aspects of
the posterior predictive distribution away from the
tails.
In agreement with the author’s recommendations
concerning priors and tuning parameters, I advocate
that Bayesian updating cease to be considered an ob-
jective black box and the room to impose subjectively
is exploited and documented.
4 About coding (J. Josse)
Although I agree with the authors that virtuous sta-
tistical practice involves justifying choices made dur-
ing the analysis, I do not think that statisticians do
not do it because it is subjective, but rather because
no one cares enough. Even if such explanations are
crucial, they are not valued by the community. It
is not common to have an entire article on the topic
of scaling (see. Bro & Smilde, 2003), and such arti-
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cles are likely to be published in applied journals not
perceived to be prestigious by other colleagues. The
pressure to be published should be mentioned.
I do not think neither that there are endless dis-
cussions on the subject of objectivity, subjectivity,
but the fact that there are many ways to deal with a
problem will always lead to this impression of subjec-
tivity. This debate seems more linked to the Bayesian
literature, perhaps because it has at least the merit
of questioning what information is incorporated into
the analysis. This could explain why the ones who
use it for mathematical simplicity, which is quite jus-
tifiable, may be seen as ”opportunistic Bayesians”. It
is crucial to make choices clear.
The choice of data coding is important. In sen-
sory analysis, there is debate as to whether the Likert
scale should be coded as quantitative or qualitative.
To be “coding free”, some methods (Pages, 2015) con-
sider a compromise between these two points of view
and highlight the specificity of each. The example
of clustering is striking. Callahan et al. (2016) also
stresses the need to document analyses with a view
to reproducibility. He has shown that there could
be ”more than 200 million possible ways of analysing
these data”. Of course, there is no “good” solution,
it “depends” on the characteristics of the data one
wants to capture.
Even when a problem is well-characterised, two
statisticians who make use of the same data will use
different approaches. This is mainly due to their per-
sonal history 2, and the expression ”when one has
a hammer, one sees nails everywhere” often applies.
This is not necessarily a problem, and experience
gained must be used. As mentioned by the authors,
collaboration should be encouraged, for example in
the development of simulation studies.
“The best future is one of variety not uni-
formity”. John Chambers
In conclusion, this paper has the merit of promot-
ing transparency, awareness of the limits of a study,
and its context-dependent nature 3. The battle is not
lost because the community is already encouraging
the sharing of code and data. It is worth remember-
ing that different points of view can be legitimate.
5 About randomness (J.-M. Marin, J.
Josse and C. Robert)
We congratulate the authors on their exposition of
the issues of modelling and experimenters’ input on
statistical inference and welcome this opportunity to
discuss some fundamentals on such neglected topics.
A first criticism is about the focus that is defi-
nitely set on (statistical) models and the ensuing (sta-
tistical) inference. We indeed wonder if this focus is
de facto set on a completely inappropriate problem-
atic, namely arguing between ourselves [meaning aca-
demic statisticians] about the best way to solve the
wrong problems, while the overwhelming majority of
users is more than ready to buy and exploit quick-
and-dirty solutions, provided these carry a sufficient
modicum of efficiency, i.e., ready to enforce imprecise
and suboptimal inference. Taking, for instance, the
perspective of an Internet ordering operator seems
much more relevant than focussing on the statistical
background for validating the existence of an elemen-
tary particle. In other words, there are many more
immediate (production) problems that call or even
scream for statistical processing than well-set scien-
tific questions.
We adhere to the argument that the scientific
realism position allows for a more workable modus
operandi.) This particularly applies to data analyses
in social sciences and medicine, as opposed to hard
sciences where (almost) all experimental conditions
can be expected to stay under control or at least to be
stationary across repeated experiments. Maybe not-
so-incidentally, the three examples treated in Section
4 belong to the former category.4 These examples are
all worth considering as they bring more details, al-
beit in specific contexts, on the authors’ arguments.
However, most of them give the impression that the
major issue in the debate does not truly stands with
the statistical model itself, referring instead to a con-
cept of model that only is relevant for hard sciences.
This was further illustrated by the mention of outliers
during the talk, a notion that is nonsensical in an M -
open perspective. It is obviously illusory to imagine
the all models are wrong debate settled but it would
have been relevant to see it directly addressed.
As a side remark, the rather hasty dismissal of ma-
chine learning in Section 5 is disappointing, because
there is at least one feature for which machine learn-
2 On a personal basis, I speak about ”a statistical sensitivity”.
3 As a French statistician, I also appreciated that the paper begins with with ”we cannot do statistics without data”.
4 We find it highly significant and rather amusing that the authors picked a clustering example as clustering is certainly one
of the statistical procedures that is the most loaded with preconceptions and forking interpretations.
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ing tools are worth considering, and it is that they
avoid leaning too much on a background model, us-
ing instead predictive performances as an assessment
criterion. The alluring almost universal availability
of such tools, as well as the appearance of objectivity
produced by the learning analogy, could have been
addressed in the spirit of the paper, especially in a
context of those techniques taking over more tradi-
tional statistical learning in many areas.
Finally, the powerful role of software should be
mentioned. Indeed, the availability of methodology
in software may explain why certain practices, even
when flawed, are still in use. Even though it is dif-
ficult to imagine software without any default values
for ”tuning” parameters, solutions may be envisaged
to force users to be aware of the underlying choices
and to assume them. In addition, all-inclusive statis-
tical solutions, used through “point-and-shoot” soft-
ware by innumerate practitioners in mostly inappro-
priate settings, give them the impression of conduct-
ing “the” statistical analysis. This false feeling of
“the” proper statistical analysis and its relevance for
this debate also transpires through the treatment of
statistical expertises by media and courts, as well as
some scientific journals.
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